Abstract-In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss introduced a cryptographic primitive called proxy re-encryption in which a proxy can transform-without seeing the plaintext-a ciphertext encrypted under one key into an encryption of the same plaintext under another key. The concept has recently drawn renewed interest. Notably, Canetti and Hohenberger showed how to properly define (and realize) chosen-ciphertext security for the primitive. Their system is bidirectional as the translation key allows converting ciphertexts in both directions. This paper presents the first unidirectional proxy re-encryption schemes with chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model (i.e., without the random oracle idealization). The first system provably fits a unidirectional extension of the Canetti-Hohenberger security model. As a second contribution, the paper considers a more realistic adversarial model where attackers may choose dishonest users' keys on their own. It is shown how to modify the first scheme to achieve security in the latter scenario. At a moderate expense, the resulting system provides additional useful properties such as non-interactive temporary delegations. Both constructions are efficient and rely on mild complexity assumptions in bilinear groups. Like the Canetti-Hohenberger scheme, they meet a relaxed flavor of chosen-ciphertext security introduced by Canetti, Krawczyk and Nielsen.
Unidirectional Chosen-Ciphertext
Secure Proxy Re-Encryption
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE concept of proxy re-encryption (PRE) dates back to the work of Blaze et al. in 1998 [11] . The goal of such systems is to securely enable the re-encryption of ciphertexts from one key to another, without relying on trusted parties. Recently, Canetti and Hohenberger [19] described a construction of proxy re-encryption providing chosen-ciphertext security according to an appropriate definition of the latter notion for PRE systems. Their construction is bidirectional in that any information to translate ciphertexts from Alice to Bob can also be used to translate from Bob to Alice. This paper deals with the case of unidirectional PRE schemes and answers the question of how to secure them against chosen-ciphertext attacks while keeping them efficient. We first achieve this goal in the sense of a natural extension of the Canetti-Hohenberger security definition to the unidirectional setting. Then, we reconsider chosen-ciphertext security in a model where weaker assumptions are made on how malicious parties' public keys are generated.
A. Background
In a PRE scheme, a proxy is given a piece of information that allows turning a ciphertext encrypted under a given public key into an encryption of the same message under a different key. A naive way for Alice to implement such a mechanism is to simply store her private key at the proxy when she is unavailable: when a ciphertext is heading for her, the proxy decrypts it using its copy of her secret key and re-encrypts the plaintext using Bob's public key. The obvious problem with this strategy is that the proxy learns the plaintext and Alice's private key.
In 1998, Blaze et al. [11] (whose work is sometimes dubbed BBS) proposed the first proxy re-encryption scheme where the proxy is kept from knowing plaintexts and secret keys. It is based on a simple modification of the ElGamal encryption scheme [26] : let be a group of prime order and let be a generator of ; Alice and Bob publish the public keys and (respectively) and keeps secret their discrete logarithms and . To send a message to Alice, a sender picks uniformly at random an integer and transmits the pair where and . The proxy is given the re-encryption key to divert ciphertexts from Alice to Bob via computing . This scheme is efficient and semantically secure under the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption in . It solves the aforementioned problem since the proxy is unable to learn the plaintext or secret keys and . Unfortunately, Blaze et al. pointed out an inherent limitation: the proxy key also allows translating ciphertexts from Bob to Alice, which may be undesirable in situations where trust relationships are not symmetric. They left open the problem of designing PRE methods without this restriction. Another shortcoming of their scheme is that the proxy and the delegatee can collude to expose the delegator's private key given and . In 2005, Ateniese et al. [4] and [5] showed the first examples of unidirectional proxy re-encryption schemes based on bilinear maps. Moreover, they obtained the master key security property in that the proxy is unable to collude with delegatees in order to expose the delegator's secret. The constructions [4] and [5] are also efficient, semantically secure assuming the intractability of decisional variants of the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem [15] .
These PRE schemes only ensure chosen-plaintext security, which seems definitely insufficient for many practical applications. Very recently, Canetti and Hohenberger [19] gave a def-0018-9448/$26.00 © 2011 IEEE inition of security against chosen ciphertext attacks for PRE schemes and described an efficient construction satisfying this definition. In their model, ciphertexts should remain indistinguishable even if the adversary has access to a re-encryption oracle (translating adversarially-chosen ciphertexts) and a decryption oracle (that "undoes" ciphertexts under certain rules). Their security analysis takes place in the standard model (without the random oracle heuristic [9] ). Like the BBS scheme [11] , their construction is bidirectional and they left as an open problem to come up with a chosen-ciphertext secure unidirectional scheme.
B. Related Work
Many papers in the literature-the first one of which being [38] -consider applications where data encrypted under a public key should eventually be encrypted under a different key . In proxy encryption schemes [24] , [33] , a receiver Alice allows a delegatee Bob to decrypt ciphertexts intended for her with the help of a proxy by providing them with shares of her private key. This requires delegatees to store an additional secret for each new delegation. Dodis and Ivan [24] present efficient proxy encryption schemes based on RSA, the Decision Diffie-Hellman problem as well as in an identity-based setting [15] , [42] under bilinear-map-related assumptions.
Proxy re-encryption schemes are a special kind of proxy cryptosystems where delegatees only need to store their own decryption key. They find applications in secure e-mail forwarding, digital rights management (DRM) or distributed storage systems (e.g., [4] and [5] ). The signature analogue, also suggested by Blaze et al. [11] in 1998, of PRE systems was formalized by Ateniese and Hohenberger [6] in 2005. The two techniques were notably combined [44] to design interoperable DRM systems where digital content can be translated between devices from different DRM domains.
From a theoretical point of view, the first positive obfuscation result for a complex cryptographic functionality was recently presented by Hohenberger, Rothblum, shelat and Vaikuntanathan [32] : they proved the existence of an efficient program obfuscator for a family of circuits implementing re-encryption.
In [29] , Green and Ateniese studied the problem of identity-based PRE and proposed a unidirectional scheme that can be made chosen-ciphertext secure. Their security results are presented only in the random oracle model. Also, the recipient of a re-encrypted ciphertext needs to know who the original receiver was in order to decrypt a re-encryption. In the standard model, Chu and Tzeng [23] described another identity-based PRE scheme that extends to provide chosen-ciphertext security. Their scheme is both multihop and unidirectional but fails to provide collusion-resistance (also called master secret security in [4] and [5] ) as the delegator's private key is trivially exposed when a dishonest delegatee and a proxy pool their information.
More recently, Ateniese et al. [3] analyzed the notion of ciphertext anonymity (a.k.a. key privacy) in proxy re-encryption. This notion 1 demands that even the proxy performing translations be unable to infer useful information on the identities of the participants between which it re-encrypts ciphertexts.
C. Our Contributions
In the unidirectional case, this paper aims at achieving chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model without sacrificing other security properties such as collusion-resistance. While the scheme of [23] can be modified to satisfy some model of chosen-ciphertext security, it fails to protect the delegator against colluding delegatees and proxies. In particular, this scheme fails to satisfy our security modeling for first level ciphertexts. We believe that, as stressed in [4] and [5] , the security of delegators against malicious delegatees and proxies should be one of the pursued goals in the design of unidirectional schemes.
To achieve this goal, we first generalize the work of Canetti and Hohenberger [19] and present the first construction of chosen-ciphertext secure and collusion-resistant 2 unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme in the standard model. Although only single-hop (like all known unidirectional schemes that resist collusions), our system is efficient and its security proof requires a noninteractive (and thus falsifiable [39] ) complexity assumption in bilinear groups. It builds on the first unidirectional scheme from [4] and [5] , which we briefly recall at the beginning of Section III. The technique used by Canetti-Hohenberger to acquire CCA-security does not directly apply to the latter scheme because, in a straightforward adaptation of [19] to [4] , the validity of translated ciphertexts cannot be publicly checked. To overcome this difficulty, we need to modify (and actually randomize) the re-encryption algorithm of Ateniese et al. so as to render the validity of re-encrypted ciphertexts publicly verifiable.
As a second contribution (and a novelty w.r.t. the proceedings version of the paper [37] ), we further strengthen our security model by allowing adversaries to inject their own keys in the system. A limitation of all known proxy re-encryption systems-even including passively secure or bidirectional ones [4] , [19] -is that their security is analyzed in a model that implicitly makes the knowledge of secret key (KOSK) assumption [12] and does not capture a scenario where the generation of malicious users' public keys is left to adversaries themselves. The KOSK model is frequently used to hedge against certain harmful adversarial behaviors. It typically requires that, before being introduced in a multiuser system, any adversarially-controlled public key should be properly registered and knowledge of the matching secret key should be proven to the certification authority (CA). For the sake of simplicity, security proofs (e.g., [8] , [12] ) frequently assume that adversaries merely reveal their private key to a so-called 'key registration authority' whenever they create a public key for themselves. As will be discussed in the second part of Section II-A, this requirement, that amounts to assume some ideal trusted key generation phase, may be worrisome to rely on in practice. We, therefore, show how to modify our first scheme to prove it secure in a more powerful model, called chosen key model, where the adversary can freely choose her own public keys without honestly following the specification of the key generation algorithm. In particular, she may even come up with public keys that are calculated as functions of honest users' keys and for which she does not know the corresponding secret keys. To handle queries involving such wicked public keys, we use techniques that were first introduced for identity-based encryption [13] .
Whenever users delegate some of their rights to another party, there is always the chance that they will either need or want to revoke those rights later on. In [4] and [5] , Ateniese et al. designed a unidirectional PRE scheme that allows for temporary delegations: that is, re-encryption keys can only be used during a restricted time interval outside which translations are not possible any longer. The latter temporary PRE assumes a trusted server periodically updating public parameters and also entails the participation of delegatees in each temporary delegation. As a third contribution, we devise 3 a chosen-ciphertext secure scheme with temporary delegation in the chosen key model. Beyond its security against strong adversaries, one of the advantages of this new scheme is that temporary delegations remain noninteractive (i.e., no action from the delegatee is required at each temporary delegation) and do not require to rely on a trusted server publishing modified parameters at discrete time intervals. We additionally outline how to optimize the storage at the proxy when re-encryption rights are granted for several consecutive time periods. Our new scheme also lends itself to extensions such as keyword-controlled delegations, where proxy keys can only re-encrypt ciphertexts that are tagged with specific keywords.
D. Roadmap
The paper is organized as follows: We recall the concept of unidirectional proxy re-encryption and its security model in Section II-A. We review the properties of bilinear maps and the intractability assumption that our scheme relies on in Section II-B. Section III describes the main new scheme, gives the intuition behind its construction and a security proof. We give in Section IV the description of the scheme secure in the chosen-key model that additionally provides temporary delegation.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Model and Security Notions
This section first recalls the syntactic definition of unidirectional proxy re-encryption suggested by Ateniese et al. [4] and [5] . We then consider an appropriate definition of chosen-ciphertext security for unidirectional PRE schemes which is directly inferred from the one given by Canetti and Hohenberger [19] in the bidirectional case. Like [19] , we consider security in the replayable CCA sense [20] where a harmless mauling of the challenge ciphertext is tolerated. 
: this algorithm is run by a trusted party that, on input of a security parameter , produces a set of public parameters to be used by all parties in the scheme.
• : on input of public parameters and a security parameter , all parties use this randomized algorithm to generate a private/public key pair . • : given public parameters , user 's private key and user 's public key , this (possibly randomized) algorithm outputs a key that allows translating second level ciphertexts intended for into first level ciphertexts encrypted for .
• : on input of public parameters , a receiver's public key and a plaintext , this probabilistic algorithm outputs a first level ciphertext that cannot be re-encrypted for another party.
• : given public parameters , a public key and a plaintext , this randomized algorithm outputs a second level ciphertext that can be re-encrypted into a first level one (intended for a possibly different receiver) using the suitable re-encryption key.
• : this (possibly randomized) algorithm takes as input public parameters , a re-encryption key and a second level ciphertext encrypted under user 's public key. The output is a first level ciphertext re-encrypted for user . In a single hop scheme, cannot be re-encrypted any further. If the well-formedness of is publicly verifiable, the algorithm should output ' ' whenever the received is ill-formed w.r. To lighten notations, we will sometimes omit to explicitly write the set of common public parameters , taken as input by all but one of the above algorithms.
CHOSEN-CIPHERTEXT SECURITY. The definition of chosen-ciphertext security that we first consider is naturally inspired from the bidirectional case [19] which in turn extends ideas from Canetti, Krawczyk and Nielsen [20] to the proxy re-encryption setting. For traditional public key cryptosystems, in this relaxation of the Rackoff-Simon definition [40] , an adversary who can simply turn a given ciphertext into another encryption of the same plaintext is not deemed successful. In the game-based security definition, the attacker is notably disallowed to ask for a decryption of a re-randomized version of the challenge ciphertext. This relaxed notion was argued in [20] to suffice for most practical applications.
Security of Second Level Ciphertexts:
This first definition considers a challenger that produces a number of public keys. As in [19] , we do not allow the adversary to adaptively determine which parties will be compromised. We also follow [19] in that we allow to adaptively query a re-encryption oracle and a decryption oracle (by "adaptively", we mean that each query may depend on the answers to previous ones). A difference with [19] is that is directly provided with all the re-encryption keys that she is entitled to know (instead of leaving her request them as she likes throughout the game). We also depart from [19] and rather follow [4] , [5] , in that we let the target public key be determined by the challenger at the beginning of the game. Unlike [4] and [5] , we allow the challenger to reveal re-encryption keys when is corrupt for honest users that differ from the target receiver. We insist that such an enhancement only makes sense for single-hop schemes (as would trivially win the game if the scheme were multihop).
Definition 2: A (single-hop) unidirectional PRE scheme is replayable chosen-ciphertext secure (RCCA) at level 2 if the probability is negligibly (as a function of the security parameter ) close to 1/2 for any PPT adversary . In our notation, is the state information maintained by while is the target user's key pair generated by the challenger that also chooses other keys for corrupt and honest parties. For such other honest parties, keys are subscripted by or and we subscript corrupt keys by . The adversary is given access to all nontrivial 4 re-encryption keys but those that would allow re-encrypting from the target user to a corrupt one. In the game, is said to have advantage if this probability, taken over random choices of and all oracles, is at least . Oracles , proceed as follows:
• Re-encryption : on input of a triple , where is a second level ciphertext and , were produced by , this oracle responds with ' ' if is not properly shaped w.r.t.
. It returns a special symbol if is corrupted and . Otherwise, the re-encrypted first level ciphertext is returned to .
• First level decryption : given a pair , where is a first level ciphertext and was produced by , this oracle returns '
' if is ill-formed w.r.t. . If the query occurs in the postchallenge phase (a.k.a. "guess" stage as opposed to the "find" stage), it outputs a special symbol if is a of the challenge pair . Otherwise, the plaintext is returned to . of are defined as follows. none If is a first level ciphertext and or belongs to another honest user, we say that is a of if . Explicitly providing the adversary with a second level decryption oracle is useless. Indeed, ciphertexts encrypted under public keys from can be re-encrypted for corrupt users given the set . Besides, second level encryptions under can be translated for other honest users using and the resulting ciphertext can be queried for decryption at the first level.
Remark: A possible enhancement of definition 2 is to allow adversaries to adaptively choose the target user at the challenge phase within the set of honest players. Namely, after having selected a set of corrupt parties among players at the beginning, the adversary receives a set of public keys, private keys of corrupt users as well as corrupt-to-corrupt, corrupt-to-honest and honest-to-honest re-encryption keys. When she outputs messages and the index of an honest user in the challenge step, she obtains an encryption of under together with all honest-to-corrupt re-encryption keys with . In this setting, a second level decryption oracle is also superfluous for schemes (like ours) where second level ciphertexts can be publicly turned into first level encryptions of the same plaintext for the same receiver. The scheme that we describe remains secure in this model at the expense of a probability of failure for the simulator that has to foresee which honest user will be attacked with probability .
Security of First Level Ciphertexts:
The above definition provides adversaries with a second level ciphertext in the challenge phase. A complementary definition of security captures their inability to distinguish first level ciphertexts as well. For single-hop schemes, is granted access to all re-encryption keys in this definition. Since first level ciphertexts cannot be re-encrypted, there is indeed no reason to keep attackers from obtaining all honest-to-corrupt re-encryption keys. The re-encryption oracle becomes useless since all re-encryption keys are available to . For the same reason, a second level decryption oracle is also unnecessary. Finally, of the challenge ciphertext are simply defined as encryptions of either or for the same public key . A single-hop scheme is said RCCA-secure at level 1 if it satisfies this notion.
Master Secret Security: In [4], Ateniese et al. define another important security requirement for unidirectional PRE schemes. This notion, termed master secret security, demands that no coalition of dishonest delegatees be able to pool their re-encryption keys in order to expose the private key of their common delegator. More formally, the following probability should be negligible as a function of the security parameter At first glance, this notion might seem too weak in that it does not consider colluding delegatees who would rather undertake to produce a new re-encryption key that was not originally given and allows re-encrypting from the target user to another malicious party . As stressed in [4] however, all known unidirectional schemes fail to satisfy such a stronger security level.
It remains an open problem to construct systems withstanding these transfer of delegation attacks.
In single-hop schemes, the notion of RCCA security at the first level is easily seen to imply the master secret security and we will only discuss the former. In the general multihop setting, the notion of master secret security appears to be the most appropriate one. However, no viable construction of multihop unidirectional system is known to date. As mentioned earlier, the scheme of [23] indeed fails to be master secret secure.
CHOSEN-CIPHERTEXT SECURITY IN THE CHOSEN-KEY MODEL.
In the previous definitions, we assume a static corruption model as in [19] . In definition 2 as well as in the model of [19] , the challenger generates public keys for all parties and allows the adversary to obtain private keys for some of them. These models do not capture a scenario where adversaries may generate public keys on behalf of corrupt parties (possibly nonuniformly or as a function of honest parties' public keys). All previous PRE systems as well as our first scheme are analyzed in models that implicitly make the knowledge of secret key (KOSK) assumption according to which users only publish public keys when they know the underlying private keys. In other settings (such as [8] , [12] ), similar restrictions are frequently imposed on adversarial behaviors: attackers are allowed to come up with their own public key but are required to also reveal the matching secret key. This mirrors the fact that, upon certification of their public key, users should provide certification authorities (CAs) with a proof of knowledge of their private key.
In the known secret key model, security proofs take advantage of the fact that the simulator itself knows dishonest users' secrets. It is tempting to justify this knowledge by arguing that, upon key registration, the simulator can rewind the adversary to extract her private key using the knowledge extractor [7] of the proof. However, attention must be paid to the fact that rewinding is very problematic in inherently concurrent environments like the Internet. Then, CAs should mandate users to provide more involved and computationally more expensive proofs of knowledge (such as [27] in the random oracle model) that guarantee online extractability. As discussed in [10] , current public key infrastructures (PKIs) do not bother to apply such thorough verifications that would suffice to realize the abstract KOSK model.
In this paragraph, we consider a more realistic model where the adversary can arbitrarily choose public keys without demonstrating knowledge of the private keys. The only limitation is that all public keys should fall into some public key space (which is predetermined by system-wide parameters shared by all parties in the system). This provides the adversary with much more flexibility and power in attacking other honest parties in the system. Schemes that are secure in the known secret key model may not necessarily be secure in the chosen-key model (although we did not find a strict separation in the context of proxy re-encryption).
Security of Second Level Ciphertexts:
The definition of second level security in the chosen-key model considers a challenger that produces a set of honest users' public keys. As in definition 2, the adversary is allowed to adaptively query a decryption oracle and a re-encryption oracle. This time however, the latter can be queried on input of adversarially-chosen delegatees' public keys. The attacker is again directly provided with all re-encryption keys for which the delegator and the delegatee are both honest. As another enhancement w.r.t. definition 2, she is granted access to a delegation oracle that returns re-encryption keys on behalf of honest delegators for arbitrary delegatees' public keys. By "arbitrary", we mean that the adversary can choose any element of the predetermined (and publicly recognizable) public key space without necessarily knowing the corresponding secret key. Such a key may even be invalid if the scheme supports invalid public keys (for which no private keys exists) that look like well-formed ones. In the next definition, we also let the target public key be chosen by the adversary (among all public keys in ) in the challenge phase.
Definition 3:
A (single-hop) unidirectional PRE scheme is replayable chosen-ciphertext secure in the chosen-key model (RCCA-CK) at level 2 if the probability is negligibly (as a function of the security parameter ) close to 1/2 for any PPT adversary . In our notation, is the state maintained by while denotes the public key of the target user that is chosen by the adversary in the set . The adversary is given access to all re-encryption keys between honest users. She is also allowed to query any re-encryption key but those that would allow re-encrypting from the target user to some user under her control. In the game, is said to have advantage if this probability, taken over random choices of and all oracles, is at least . Oracles , proceed as follows:
• Delegation : on input with, where is a public key in HU (and in any stage) and is a public key of 's choosing (for which she is not required to reveal the private key), this oracle responds with the re-encryption key . We insist that no such query can involve as a delegator at any time. Although more power is granted to the adversary, the above model is still nonadaptive. In a truly adaptive model, would be allowed to dynamically corrupt users that are initially honest. In fact, the scenario of definition 3 is easily seen to be equivalent to a completely similar game (in particular, delegation and re-encryption queries are treated in the same way) where first statically chooses which players she wants to corrupt within a set of users before being given all public keys and corrupt users' private keys. We leave open the problem of handling fully adaptive adversaries here.
Security of First Level Ciphertexts: As in the known secret key model, a second definition of security captures the inability to distinguish first level ciphertexts as well. For single-hop schemes, the adversary is granted access to all re-encryption keys in this definition (i.e., this time, even can be the delegator's public key when invokes oracle with delegatees' public keys of her choosing). As above, the re-encryption oracle becomes useless since all possible re-encryption keys are made available to . Again, of the challenge ciphertext are simply defined as encryptions of either or for the same target public key . In fact the security of first level encryptions can be captured by a simpler definition where the adversary is challenged on a single honest user's public key and is allowed to generate herself any other public key for which she makes delegation queries or re-encryption queries (the honest user being the delegator in either case).
B. Bilinear Maps and Complexity Assumptions
whenever . We shall assume the intractability of a variant, introduced for the first time in [14] , of the Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem which is, given with , to distinguish from random elements of .
Definition 4 [14]:
The -weak Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion assumption ( -wDBDHI) posits the computational infeasibility of distinguishing from random given . A distinguisher -breaks the assumption if it runs in time and
The -wDBDHI problem is obviously not easier than the -DBDHI problem [13] , where the challenge is to recognize given . Dodis and Yampolskiy [25] showed the generic hardness of -DBDHI and their result implies the generic computational infeasibility of -wDBDHI. Boneh et al. [14] also gave generic intractability results for a wide class of assumptions that encompasses -wDBDHI and many others. To prove our results, we only use the above assumption for constant values of whereas this parameter depends on the number of adversarial queries in several earlier applications (e.g., [25] ). In our setting, the intractability of -wDBDHI can be classified among mild decisional assumptions (according to the terminology of [18] ) as its strength does not depend on the number of queries allowed to adversaries. In some of our schemes, even suffices and we obtain a slightly relaxed variant of the DBDH problem. The 1-wDBDHI assumption is indeed equivalent to the Squared Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption which is the infeasibility of deciding whether on input of .
C. One-Time Signatures
In order to apply the Canetti-Halevi-Katz methodology [22] , we need one-time signatures. Such a primitive consists of a triple of algorithms such that, on input of a security parameter , generates a one-time key pair while, for any message , outputs 1 whenever and 0, otherwise.
As in [22] , we need strongly unforgeable one-time signatures, which means that no PPT adversary can create a new signature for a previously signed message (according to [2] ).
Definition 5:
is a strong one-time signature if the probability where denotes 's state information across stages, is negligible for any PPT forger .
III. UNIDIRECTIONAL SCHEME IN THE KNOWN SECRET KEY MODEL
Our construction is inspired from the first unidirectional scheme suggested in [4] and [5] where second level ciphertexts , that are encrypted under the public key , can be re-encrypted into first level ciphertexts using the re-encryption key . Using his private key s.t. , the receiver can then obtain the message. The Canetti-Hohenberger method for achieving CCA-security borrows from [17] , [22] , [34] in that it appends to the ciphertext a checksum value consisting of an element of raised to the random encryption exponent . In the security proof, the simulator uses the publicly verifiable validity of ciphertexts in groups equipped with bilinear maps. Unfortunately, the same technique does not directly apply to secure the unidirectional PRE scheme of [4] against chosen-ciphertext attacks. The difficulty is that, after re-encryption, level 1 ciphertexts have one component in the target group and pairings cannot be used any longer to check the equality of two discrete logarithms in groups and . Therefore, the simulator cannot tell apart well-shaped level 1 ciphertexts from invalid ones.
The above technical issue is addressed by having the proxy replace by a pair , for a random "blinding exponent" that hides the re-encryption key in , in such a way that all ciphertext components but remain in . This still allows the second receiver holding s.t.
to compute . To retain the publicly verifiable well-formedness of re-encrypted ciphertexts however, the proxy needs to include in the ciphertext so as to prove the consistency of the encryption exponent w.r.t. the checksum value.
Of course, since the re-encryption algorithm is probabilistic, many first level ciphertexts may correspond to the same second level one. For this reason, we need to tolerate a harmless form of malleability (akin to those accepted as reasonable in [2] , [20] , and [43] ) of ciphertexts at level 1.
A. Description
Our system is reminiscent of the public key cryptosystem obtained by applying the Canetti-Halevi-Katz transform [22] to the second selective-ID secure identity-based encryption scheme described in [13] . 5 Like the Canetti-Hohenberger construction [19] , the present scheme uses a strongly unforgeable one-time signature to tie several ciphertext components altogether and offer a safeguard against chosen-ciphertext attacks in the fashion of Canetti et al. [22] . For simplicity, the description assumes that verification keys of the one-time signature are encoded as elements from . In practice, such verification keys are typically much longer than and a target collision-resistant hash function should be applied to map them onto .
• (1) and (2), receiver can obtain . The algorithm outputs ' ' otherwise. Outputs of the re-encryption algorithm are perfectly indistinguishable from level 1 ciphertexts produced by the sender. Indeed, if , we can write
As in the original scheme described in [4] , second level ciphertexts can be publicly turned into first level ciphertexts encrypted for the same receiver if the identity element of is used as a re-encryption key. In the first level decryption algorithm, relations (3)- (5) guarantee that re-encrypted ciphertexts have the correct shape. Indeed, since for some unknown exponent , equality (4) implies that . From (3), it comes that . We finally note that first level ciphertexts can be publicly re-randomized by changing into for a random . However, the pairing value remains constant and, re-randomizations of a given first level ciphertext are publicly detectable.
B. Security
For convenience, we will prove security under an equivalent formulation of the 3-wDBDHI assumption.
Lemma 1: The 3-wDBDHI problem is equivalent to decide whether equals or a random value given as input. Proof: Given a tuple of elements , we can easily construct an instance of the 3-wDBDHI problem by setting , which implicitly defines and . Then, it comes that . The converse implication is easily established and demonstrates the equivalence between both problems.
Theorem 1:
Assuming the strong unforgeability of the onetime signature, the scheme is RCCA-secure at level 2 under the 3-wDBDHI assumption.
Proof: Let be a modified 3-wDBDHI instance. We build an algorithm deciding if out of a successful RCCA adversary . Before describing , we first define an event and bound its probability to occur. Let denote the challenge ciphertext given to in the game. Let be the event that, at some point, issues a decryption query for a first level ciphertext or a re-encryption query where but . In the "find" stage, has simply no information on . Hence, the probability of a prechallenge occurrence of does not exceed if is the overall number of oracle queries and denotes the maximal probability (which by assumption does not exceed ) that any one-time verification key is output by . In the "guess" stage, clearly gives rise to an algorithm breaking the strong unforgeability of the one-time signature. Therefore, the probability , where the second term accounts for the probability of definition 5, must be negligible by assumption.
We now proceed with the description of that simply halts and outputs a random bit if occurs. In a preparation phase, generates a one-time signature key pair and provides with public parameters including and for random . Observe that and define a "hash function"
. In the following, we call the set of honest parties, including user that is assigned the target public key and the set of corrupt parties. Throughout the game, 's environment is simulated as follows.
• Key generation: public keys of honest users are defined as for a randomly chosen
The target user's public key is set as with . The key pair of a corrupt user is set as , for a random , so that can be given to . To generate re-encryption keys from player to player , has to distinguish several situations: -If and , returns the element which is a valid re-encryption key.
-If and , then responds with that has also the correct distribution.
-If , returns the re-encryption key .
-If and , then reveals the key which is also computable.
• Re-encryptionqueries: when facing a re-encryption query from user to user for a second level ciphertext , returns ' ' if relations (1) and (2) 
Theorem 2:
Assuming the strong unforgeability of the onetime signature, the scheme is RCCA-secure at level 1 under the 3-wDBDHI assumption.
Proof: The proof is very similar to the one of theorem 1. We construct an algorithm that is given a 3-wDBDHI instance and uses the adversary to decide if .
Before describing , we consider the same event as in the proof of theorem 1 except that it can only arise during a decryption query (since there is no re-encryption oracle). Assuming the strong unforgeability of the one-time signature, such an event occurs with negligible probability as detailed in the proof of theorem 1. We can now describe our simulator that simply halts and outputs a random bit if ever occurs. Let also denote the challenge ciphertext at the first level.
Algorithm generates a one-time key pair and the same public parameters as in theorem 1. Namely, it sets and with so that . As in the proof of theorem 1, identifies the target receiver. The attack environment is simulated as follows.
• , which is an occurrence of and implies 's termination. In the "guess" stage, must ensure that differs from messages , of the challenge phase before answering the query.
• Challenge: when the first phase is over, outputs messages and flips a bit . Then, it chooses and sets and .
Since and , is a valid encryption of with the random exponents and whenever . When is random, perfectly hides and cannot guess with better probability than . Eventually, bets that if correctly guesses and that is random otherwise.
C. Efficiency
The first level decryption algorithm can be optimized using ideas from [34] , [36] . Namely, verification tests (3) and (4) can be simultaneously achieved with high confidence by the receiver who can choose a random and test whether
Hence, computing a quotient of two pairings (which is faster than evaluating two independent pairings [28] ) and two extra exponentiations suffice to check the validity of the ciphertext. It could also be desirable to shorten ciphertexts that are significantly lengthened by one-time signatures and their public keys. To this end, using the Boneh-Katz technique [16] unfortunately prevents from publicly verifying the validity of ciphertexts, which is crucial to keep our security proofs simple. Hence, the most convenient way to have compact ciphertexts is to borrow ideas from Boyen, Mei and Waters [17] : ciphertext components and become unnecessary if the checksum value is computed using the Waters "hashing" technique [45] applied to a collision-resistant hash of . This improvement in the ciphertext size unfortunately comes at the expense of a long public key (made of about 160 elements of as in [45] ) and a loose reduction.
In the random oracle model, we can simultaneously keep short public keys and ciphertexts if we compute using a random oracle . By programming the latter using standard techniques in the security proof, we additionally get a tight security reduction.
It is also worth mentioning that the random oracle model allows dispensing with trusted setup assumptions for the generation of , the discrete logarithms of which must be safely erased by the trusted party performing the setup in the above description of the scheme.
IV. SCHEMES IN THE CHOSEN-KEY MODEL
In this section, we suggest modifications of our first scheme that can be proven secure in the sense of definition 3, where dishonest users' public keys can be arbitrarily chosen on-the-fly by the adversary invoking the delegation oracle and the re-encryption oracle.
The main construction that we describe allows for temporary delegations: re-encryption keys are associated with definite time periods during which they can be used to translate ciphertexts. The simpler case where delegations are permanent is tackled with by merely instantiating the scheme with a single time period as explained in Section IV-B.
A. Noninteractive Scheme With Temporary Delegation
We describe a scheme supporting temporary delegation. Like temporary unidirectional PRE suggested in [4] , [5] , and [37] , 6 it only allows the proxy to re-encrypt messages from to during a limited time period, but takes a different approach. Prior proposals involve a trusted server that changes systemwide parameters at discrete time intervals: at the beginning of period , the server publicizes a group element that erases the old one
. If the scheme must be prepared for time periods, elements can alternatively be generated all at once at setup time. This removes the need for a trusted server but incurs linear public storage in the number of time periods. In the random oracle model, the sequence can be derived from a random oracle but, even in this case, schemes of [4] , [5] , and [37] retain an interactive (albeit simple) delegation protocol where delegatees publish a delegation acceptance value at the beginning of each period during which they must be able to receive delegations.
We depart from [4] , [5] , and [37] in that we do not assume changing public parameters produced by a trusted server. Public parameters are fixed for the lifetime of the system and we do not require the random oracle model either. Also, our delegation mechanism is kept entirely noninteractive and does not require any action from the delegatee who remains entirely passive: delegation is achieved via a single message sent by the delegator to the proxy as in Section III.
We assume that the scheme is prepared for a polynomial (in ) number of time periods. In the description hereafter, both encryption algorithms and the re-encryption algorithm all take the period number as additional input. The formal syntactic definition is the following. 
: this algorithm is run by a trusted party that, on input of a security parameter , produces a set of public parameters to be used by all parties in the scheme and an integer which is the number of time periods.
• : on input of public parameters , an integer and a security parameter , all parties use this randomized algorithm to generate a private/public key pair . • : given public parameters , an integer , user 's private key , user 's public key and an integer , this (possibly randomized) algorithm outputs a key that allows translating second level ciphertexts intended for into first level ciphertexts encrypted for for the time period .
• : on input of public parameters , an integer , a receiver's public key , an integer and a plaintext , this probabilistic algorithm outputs a first level ciphertext for the time period that cannot be re-encrypted for another party. • : given public parameters , an integer , a public key , an integer and a plaintext , this randomized algorithm outputs a second level ciphertext for the time period that can be re-encrypted into a first level one (intended for a possibly different receiver) using the suitable re-encryption key.
• : this (possibly randomized) algorithm takes as input public parameters , an integer , a re-encryption key with and a second level ciphertext for time period encrypted under user 's public key. The output is a first level ciphertext for time period re-encrypted for user . In a single hop scheme, cannot be re-encrypted any further. If the well-formedness of is publicly verifiable, the algorithm should output ' ' whenever is ill-formed w.r.t. .
• : on input of a private key , a first level ciphertext , two integers and and system-wide parameters , this algorithm outputs a plaintext or a message ' '.
• : given a private key , a second level ciphertext , two integers and and common public parameters , this algorithm returns either a plaintext or ' '. Moreover, for any common public parameters , for any message and any couple of private/public key pair , these algorithms should satisfy the following conditions of correctness:
At level 2, the considered security model is a straightforward extension (where the adversary chooses both a target user and a target period that the end of the "find" stage) of the one expressed by definition 3 with simple restrictions: the adversary is not allowed to query delegations from user for the attacked period . In addition, she is disallowed to query the re-encryption of the challenge pair during the target period or a first level decryption of its derivatives (the notion of derivative being generalized by imposing that a second level encryption and its derivatives pertain to the same period number).
The scheme mixes the ideas of our first construction with the first identity-based encryption scheme suggested by Boneh and Boyen [13] . More precisely, the generation of re-encryption keys is randomized and actually reminiscent of the algorithm deriving decryption keys from identities in the IBE system (when period numbers are seen as identities). In a nutshell, the translation key from to during period consists of a pair for some and where is an identity-hashing function such as the one used in [13] . The pair satisfies . Then, when ciphertexts are computed as at level 2, the underlying idea of the re-encryption algorithm is to translate them into In order to preserve the publicly verifiable validity of first level ciphertexts however, the technique of Section III must be applied twice to postpone the (implicit) calculation of both and until the decryption takes place at the first level.
• : is exactly as in Section IV. (8) does not hold. Otherwise, return . As in Section IV, the correctness of the re-encryption procedure follows from the fact that re-encryption keys satisfy
When raising both members to the power , we find Since , where is the encryption exponent, relations (9) and (10) imply that and .
From (11), it comes that
The scheme is slightly less efficient and features longer ciphertexts than in Section III. On the other hand, it offers security guarantees in a stronger model. As established by the next two theorems, its security additionally rests on a weaker intractability assumption which is the -wDBDHI assumption with .
Theorem 3:
If is a strongly secure one-time signature, the scheme with temporary delegation is RCCA-CK-secure at level 2 under the 1-wDBDHI assumption.
Proof: We show how to solve a 1-wDBDHI instance using an RCCA adversary in the chosen key model.
As in previous proofs, we first call the event the comes up with a query on a valid ciphertext including components such that is the same as in the challenge phase but . In the "find" stage, has simply no information on so that occurs with probability at most if is the overall number of oracle queries and denotes the maximal probability (which does not exceed ) that any one-time verification key is produced by . In the "guess" stage, clearly gives rise to an algorithm breaking the strong unforgeability of the one-time signature. Therefore, the probability , where denotes the maximal probability of defeating the one-time signature security, must be negligible by assumption.
We now describe a 1-wDBDHI solver . In a preparation phase, it generates a one-time key pair and provides with public parameters including and for random . Observe that and define a function
In the model that extends definition 3, has to guess upfront the honest user that will be 's prey. In addition, it must foresee the time period for which the challenge ciphertext will have to be generated. Hence, the solver draws two integers and , hoping that the attack will pertain to user at period (the probability of this event is non-negligible as long as and are both polynomial). The whole attack environment is then emulated as follows.
• At level 1, the model does not change and the adversary can still query all re-encryption keys without restrictions.
Theorem 4:
Assuming the strong unforgeability of the onetime signature, the scheme is RCCA-CK-secure at level 1 under the 1-wDBDHI assumption.
Proof: Let be a RCCA-CK adversary at level 1. We describe an algorithm that decides if given . Let be the challenge ciphertext. As above, we start by defining an event which is the same as in the proof of theorem 3. Assuming the strong security of the one-time signature, this event comes about with negligible probability as detailed in the proof of prior theorems. We now describe our simulator that simply halts and outputs a random bit if ever happens. As in the previous proof, the simulator picks a one-time key pair and sets up public parameters as and , with , so that we have . The adversary's view is then simulated as follows.
• Key generation: algorithm generates a public key , for a random , so that is the implicitly defined secret.
• Delegation queries: at any time, can output a public key of her choosing and a time period and request to generate a re-encryption key on behalf of user 0 acting as a delegator. Since and for a known value , can proceed as in the proof of theorem 3 by drawing and returning (13) which has the correct distribution since, if we define , we have and . Both parts of (13) 
B. Nontemporary PRE in the Chosen-Key Model
In settings where delegations should be permanent rather than temporary, one can simply instantiate the above scheme with a single time period. In this case, the scheme can be further simplified by defining the functions as constants for any user .
C. PRE With Windowed Delegation
It may happen that temporary delegations should take place during several consecutive time periods whereas these periods should be short enough to give fine-time granularity. For instance, the delegator may want to set up his public key for one-day periods and grant specific decryption rights during several months. In such situations, the temporary PRE suggested in Section IV-A requires the generation of a new re-encryption key at each time period and thus incurs re-encryption keys that have linear length in the duration of the delegation.
By appropriately modifying the scheme using ideas borrowed from forward-secure public key encryption [14] , [21] , re-encryption key sizes can be decreased from to , where denotes the length of the windowed delegation (i.e., the number periods during which translation keys should be effective). Each user's public key now comprises additional group elements , where is the total number of periods that the key is prepared for. The scheme described in Section IV-A bears salient resemblance with the selective-ID secure IBE scheme of Boneh-Boyen [13] : indeed, the function applies the Boneh-Boyen identity hashing by seeing period numbers as identities. For such windowed delegations, the forementioned number theoretic hash function is more convenient to instantiate as , using the binary expansion of . We imagine binary tree of height where the root (at depth 0) has label . When a node at depth has label , its children are labeled with and . The leaves of the tree correspond to time periods in the obvious way, periods being indexed from 0 to and stage being associated with the leaf labeled by . Let use assume that a delegator holds a public key and wishes to delegate to user , whose public key includes , during periods . First, to each tree node with label at depth , user assigns the node key according the Boneh-Boyen-Goh HIBE system [14] (by seeing as a vector of binary identities). As in [14] , such a node key allows iteratively deriving similar keys for all 's descendants until reaching the leaves for which keys only consist of and actually suffice to re-encrypt ciphertexts during period . To allow re-encryptions for a window of time periods, the delegator only provides the proxy with the smallest set of node keys that contains an ancestor of each leaf falling in (and no ancestor of leaves outside this interval). Then, the proxy only has to store group elements instead of using the method of Section IV-A.
The price to pay is that a stronger assumption (i.e., the -wDBDHI assumption where ) is needed to prove security results in a security model that naturally extends the one used in Section IV-A. Namely, at level 2 (the model obviously does not change at level 1), security is captured by a game where the attacked period must be outside the union of all time-windows for which the adversary has requested delegations from the target user. We omit to give detailed security proofs here but it is not hard to convince oneself that security in this game more or less trivially follows from the selective-ID security of the underlying HIBE [14] .
D. Introducing Warrants and Keywords in Proxy Re-Encryption
It may be desirable for delegators to only permit the re-encryption of ciphertexts that are tagged with specific keywords. For example, a traveling businessman may want the proxy to only re-direct incoming encrypted emails to his secretary when the tagged keyword is "urgent". Rather than keywords, second level ciphertexts can be tagged with a warrant that specifies conditions under which re-encryption should be permitted. A natural way to impose such restrictions is to introduce these warrants or keywords in re-encryption keys in such a way that proxies will be limited to only translate a particular class of ciphertexts.
The above scheme is actually amenable to provide warrantbased and keyword-based delegations. It suffices to replace the Boneh-Boyen [13] identity hashing with Waters' adaptive-ID secure identity hashing that, on input of -bit strings , calculates using a random -vector that supersedes in user 's public key [45] . To generate a re-encryption key using a delegatee's public key and the warrant , the delegator computes Such a key only allows translating second level ciphertexts that are calculated as per where . The security proofs (in a model that naturally generalizes the one of the scheme with temporary delegation) rely on the same assumption but with a looser reduction due to the use of Waters' technique.
Identity-based techniques and proxy re-encryption can be mixed in several settings. Other extensions are indeed possible in a natural analogue of the selective-ID security model [13] for IBE schemes (i.e., a model defined by selective-keyword games where the adversary should choose the target keyword upfront and before seeing any public key). By borrowing ideas from the identity-based broadcast encryption with constant-size ciphertexts (derived from the Boneh-Boyen-Goh [14] hierarchical IBE) suggested in [1] , we can construct a keyword-based PRE where ciphertexts are tagged with multiple keywords. Re-encryption is then permitted as long as the proxy has a translation key corresponding to at least one of them. In this case, ciphertexts retain constant (i.e., independent of the number of tagging keywords) size at the expense of private keys that have quadratic size in the maximal number of keywords that a ciphertext can be associated with. Using ideas from Sahai-Waters [41] , one can also imagine to design keyword-based PRE systems with error-tolerance: the proxy is allowed to re-encrypt ciphertexts if it holds a translation key for a keyword being sufficiently close (according to some metric) to that of the ciphertext. More generally, if ciphertexts are tagged with a set of descriptive attributes, attribute-based encryption techniques [30] can even be used to enable re-encryption when ciphertext attributes fit the access structure of the re-encryption key.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
We presented the first unidirectional PRE realizations with chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model (i.e., without using the random oracle heuristic). We also refined our security definitions by allowing adversaries to introduce arbitrary delegatees' public keys in the system. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first security results in the so-called chosen key model for the proxy re-encryption primitive. One of the new schemes additionally allows for temporary delegations and other extensions.
Many open problems still remain. One of them would be to devise secure schemes in a fully adaptive corruption model. The very existence of collusion-resistant multihop unidirectional systems dwells a (perhaps even more) challenging open question. Canetti and Hohenberger [19] also mentioned the problem of securely obfuscating CCA-secure re-encryption. Ateniese, Benson and Hohenberger [3] raised the one of key-private PRE in the chosen-ciphertext setting.
